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Statement of Contribution
This work is motivated by the increase in the number of premium store brands over the past
decade, now such store brands may be more expensive per unit volume than national brands.
vVith this perspective, in this work we explore advertising and pricing decisions national and
premium store brands can make. We develop an analytical game theoretic model using a
quadratic advertisement cost function. Using this model we characterize the advertising and
pricing decisions each of the brands will make under different market conditions. We find
that in some cases only the national brand or the store brand will advertise, both brands will
advertise, or no brand will advertise. In the case when pricing and advertising decisions are
made in unison, we find that a national brand is better off free riding from the advertising
efforts of the store brand. Alternatively when pricing and advertising decisions are made
sequentially or separately, we find that either of the two brands may advertise as determined
by market conditions. It is such insights that may not be exhibited in practice, that we hope
will be considered by brand managers.

National and Store Brand Advertising Strategies
November 25, 2013

Abstract
As the propensity of premium store brands increases, retailers must consider differ
ent ways to drive sales besides promotional strategies. With this in mind, we consider
a national brand and a (premium) store brand co-existing in a market. Each brand
has to decide the amount to invest in advertising its product and the prices to charge
its customers, which can be determined separately or in unison. When either adver
tising expenditures or pricing decisions are set, each brand must keep in mind that
the advertising efforts and revenue may spillover between the two brands, customers
that intend to purchase the national brand may end up purchasing the store brand and
vice versa. We derive an analytical model of the situations described and characterize
equilibrium advertising decisions. We find that the characteristics of a premium store
brand may depend on which marketing/promoting instrument (advertising or pricing)
is the primary method for driving demand; and in some situations a national brand
may be better off to not advertise at all and instead let the premium store brand carry
out all of the advertising.

1

Introduction

In this paper we consider a national brand (NB), also referred to as a manufacturer, and a
store brand (SB), also referred to as a retailer, within the same marketplace. We characterize
the equilibrium advertising strategies of the NB and the SB as a function of market state. In
particular, we consider whether the market has spillover demand or not, and whether there is
profit sharing amongst the national and store brands. Though they have been around since
the 1950s (Pa.t.ti and Fisk, 1982), the majority of store brands still compete with national
brands based on price using some form of promotion or pricing strategy. However, as the
market share of private labels increases (Kumar and Stecnkamp, 20()7), more retailers are
introducing premium store (house) brands (Huang and Huddlest.on, 2009) that may actually
1

be more expensive than national brands (Karp, 2012). In these situations the SB, retailer,
may actually want to advertise its product, and not let the NB, manufacturer, do all of
the advertising. In this paper we first present the general model we consider. We then
derive the advertising decisions each brand will make given that prices are fixed a priori,
similarly the pricing decisions each brand will make given the advertising decisions are fixed
a priory. Finally, we present the advertising and pricing decisions each brand will make if
both decisions are made in unison.
We use a Stackelberg model, with the national brand as the first mover in this paper.
As discussed in detail in Section 3, we consider both advertising and pricing decisions made
by each of the brands. We assume the NB and SB consider only one product, or a single
product category, and not a collection of products/categories as Erdem and Chang (2012)
show there may be cross categorical affects for both store and national brand. In solving for
the optimal advertising and pricing levels, we find situations where the store brand will want
to advertise in conjunction with the national brand. Similarly, there are situations when
the store brand will not want to advertise at all and let the national brand do all of the
advertising. Surprisingly, we find cases when the national brand will want to let the store
brand do all of the advertising. We also find that the characteristics of a premium store
brand may depend on which primary method is used for marketing/promoition (advertising
or pricing). These results provide managerial insight as to possible reactions by a national
brand to a new premium store brand.
In the remainder of the paper we first discuss related work in Section 2. We then,
in Section 3, introduce and formally discuss and solve the advertising/pricing models. In
Section 4, we present some managerial insights gleaned from our analytical results and
conclude the paper.

2

Related Work

While there is rich literature in studying the dynamics between national and store brands,
for a comprehensive and excellent review, see Sethuraman (2009), that compiles and assesses
results from analytical models with empirical evidences and credibility from practice exec
utives, most of the attention is paid on the competitive basis since a SB product is often
viewed as a clone (copycat or generic) to the NB's. Because of this underlying assumption on
the inferiority of SB products, it generally limits the retailer's strategy space to whether to
launch SB products or not (Horowib;, 2000; Haju et aI., 1995), and if so, how the SB should
promote (in price) to undercut the NB and thus gain market share given certain market
structure and product characteristics (TvIills, 1999; Raju et a1., 1990; Sayman E't aI., 2(02).
2

On the other hand, from the incumbent manufacturer's (NB's) perspective, the strategic
decisions are then often confined to how to deter the SB's entrance (Mills, 1999), or how
to develop effective counter-strategy in order to differentiate the NB from the SB or defend
leadership in quality (Choi and Coughlan, 2006; Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998). With this
paper we address not only pricing strategies a SB can employ, but also advertising strategies.
Most studies advocate the NB manufacturers to invest in advertising and developing
new products, while discouraging the SB retailers from advertising but rather promoting
low prices, as said by Webster (2000) "price is the dominant variable in many store brands'
value proposition." Although earlier work glean interesting insights into market equilibriums
in terms of the existence of the SB and its price-promoting strategy in response to the NB's
actions, these recommendations are mainly based on the assumption of no sustainable strong
SBs, usually established through brand advertising. This may have been true traditionally
as Brester and Schroeder (1995) show that the estimates of the marginal effectiveness of
advertising on generic meats are not significant. However, in recent years, premium SBs
have been introduced by many retailers to achieve differentiation from other stores and are
positioned on superior quality rather than price, e.g., "Archer Farms" at Target Corp and
"Simple Truth" at Kroger Co (Karp, 2012). Levy and Gendel-Gutennan (2012) provide a
conceptual framework to show the importance of creating a strong SB through advertising
and innovation. It was found empirically that advertising also has an indirect effect on the
SB's perceived quality, a most important factor in influencing customer's purchase intention
of the SB.
Despite the recently discovered importance of advertising SB products, we find very little
analytical investigation into how the NB should advertise to influence purchase intention,
facing the emergence of premium SBs as retailers gear up effort in brand advertising and
store loyalty. Birwaclker (2011) proposes that investing in holistic brand development pro
grams benefits not only NB manufacturers but also progressive SB retailers to drive higher
differentiation and lasting relationship with their shoppers.

Karray and Zaccour (2005,

2006) propose an analytical model in this area that characterizes the equilibrium advertising
decisions made by each brand when a NB partially covers a SB's advertising costs. Fnr
thermore BirwacU,er (2011) suggests, to compete for consumers' dollars, joining forces or
strategic partnerships between store and national brands may be formed in gaining shopper
insights and identifying focused destination categories. Therefore, the effect of advertising
can be either category building (also known as informative/complementary) or share stealing
(persuasive/competitive) as documented by existing literature (Dub6 and Manchanda, 2005;
Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Vilcassim ct aI., 1999).
Despite the rich literature in studying the strategic roles of advertising for firms facing
3

competition, only a few papers examine the interaction between advertising and pricing de
cision. Vilcassim et al. (1999) propose an oligopoly model to econometrically analyze the
dynamic pricing and advertising competition among firms and find empirically that firms
compete on advertising but collaborate on pricing. Karray and Martin-HerrAn (2008) study
the relationship between the two decisions made sequentially through a game-theoretic model
and find that in the case of competitive advertising, the pricing effects depends on the inten
sity of the competition and advertising. However, the target of their retailer's advertising is
not on the SB product but rather the store itself so such complementary advertising always
improves both the NB's and SB's demand; while in this paper, we consider premium store
brands so their advertising campaigns may either be complementary or competitive. In a
differential game setting, assuming symmetric price sensitivity for both the NB and SB for
tractability, Karray and lvIart.in-Hern1.n (2009) study the joint advertising and pricing deci
sions facing the two brands and find the retailer's best response to competitive advertising
also depends on the intensity of pricing and advertising competition while the manufacturer
always concedes on price and advertising under greater competition.
In this paper we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the NB/SB (man
ufacturer /retailer) strategic advertising and pricing interaction, in the spirit of Karney and
Martln-HC'rrAn (2008). Making pricing and product selection decisions has been examined
thoroughly in the above-mentioned earlier works, however in this work we examine both
pricing and advertising decisions being made in unison or separately. Specifically, comple
mentary and competitive advertising is incorporated into the model to evaluate the impact
of the collaboration/competition level on the two parties' advertising and pricing decisions.
Attention is given to what advertising and pricing strategy the market leader (the NB man
ufacturer) would adopt in anticipation of the response from the follower (the SB retailer)
and the extent to which the two collaborate or compete. In addition to characterizing the
optimal advertising and pricing decisions by the manufacturer and the retailer, we further
consider and derive the conditions for the corner solutions in which only one channel member
exerts efforts in advertising, and the conditions under which premium SB may possibly arise.

3

Model and Analysis

In this section we present the analytical model that determines the NB's and SB's best
pricing and advertising strategies. In Section 3.1 we introduce the notation of the model and
present the most general formulation. We start with analyzing special cases of the general
formulation in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, in which we consider advertising decisions with pricing
decisions given, and pricing decisions with advertising decisions given, respectively. Finally,
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in Section 3.4 we solve the general instance with both pricing and advertising decisions made
in unison.

3.1

Notation and Model Setup

In the model we consider a national brand, NB, and a store brand, SB, each setting their own
retail prices, Pi with i E {N, S}, where PN is the retail price of the NB and Ps is the retail
price of the SBI. Similarly both brands will set the amount of advertising effort to exert in
order to increase market sizes, Ai, i E {N, S}. As supported by the findings in Slldhir (2001)
and Che et al. (2007), we model the manufacturer-retailer relationship using a manufacturer
Stackelberg framework. In fact in addition to the two papers above, in a recent literature
survey no paper was found to use Nash simultaneous moves (Set.huraman, 2009, page 8) in
this setting.
The parameters of the model that are exogenously determined will now be discussed. As
the NB is already established there is a pre-existing base market size AN with neither the
SB nor NB exerting any additional advertising effort. Without loss of generality, we assume
the manufacturing costs of both products to be zero. A fraction (3 E (0,1) of all NB sales
will go the SB as profit, and therefore the wholesale price of the NB product is (1 - (3)PN.
Though each brand is setting its own advertising decision, as the two brands are selling
substitutable products, ai measures the spillover effect of advertising effort from i E {N, S}
to j E {N, S} : j =f i, (as E (0,1) and aN E (-1,1)). For example, aN is the advertising
effect from NB to SB. The range of aN, is used to capture both complementary, aN > 0,
and competitive, aN < 0, advertising scenarios. We do not consider as negative, as we do
not model a national brand advertising directly against a store brand good.
Since pricing has an effect on the demand for goods of each brand, we introduce ai, i E
{N, S} as the negative effect of price on the demand for the good sold by i. Similarly, we
define bi as the positive effect the competitor's price, j E {S, N} has on demand for the
good sold by i E {N, S} : i =f j. For example, aN measures the impact of PN on the demand
for NB's product, similarly bN measure the impact of Ps on the demand for NB's product.
Finally, we use c;,i E {N, S}, to denote the marginal cost of advertising for each of the
brands. As we will discuss below the advertising cost is assumed to be quadratic in the
market size.
1 Please

see Appendix A for an exhaustive list of the notation used.
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Profit Functions
Using the notation introduced above, we formally present the profit functions we use in our
model. We use

7ri

to denote the profit of brand i E {N, S}. We define

7rN

as:

For given values of the decision variables, AN and PN, (1) is the profit function of the NB.
(1 - (3) is the proportion of all NB sales revenue that the NB retains. PN is the per unit
price of the NB, and (AN + AN + aN As - aNPN + bNPs) are the number of units sold as a
function of the advertising efforts of both brands (AN + aNAs), the base market size AN,
and the pricing strategies of both brands bNps - aNPN. Note that we are assuming the cost
of advertising is not linear but quadratically increasing in the difference of desired and base
market sizes. While the quadratic functional form captures the diminishing marginal returns
to advertising as is done in other works (Amrollche et aI., 20D8a,b; Dulle and Manchancla,
2005; KarnLY and IVlmtfn-Herrrin, 2008, 2009; Vilcassim el; aI., 1999), we further generalize
the cost function to take into account that the marginal return rate on advertising may be
decreasing in the base market size AN, i.e., advertising may cost more for the manufacturer
with high base market size AN to further expand the market. Given the actions of the NB,
the profit function for the SB can be written as:
7rs(As,PsIAN,PN)

= ps(As + as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN)
+(3PN(A N + AN + aNAs - aNPN

(2)

+ bNPs)

-cs [(As +as(AN +AN))2 - (as (AN +AN))2].

Given the advertising and pricing actions of the NB, the first term of the sum in (2) is the
profit from all the SB sales. The second term is the fraction of the profit the SB receives from
the NB. Finally, the last term is the cost of advertising decisions made by the SB. Because
the advertising cost cs [(As

+ as(AN + AN ))2 -

(as(AN

+ AN ))2]

is uniquely determined

by the market size decision As and vice versa, for the ease of explanation, henceforth we
would use advertising level when referring to Ai, i E {N, S}. Here we assume the SB may
have an advantage as a follower to inherit a base market size of as(AN

+ AN),

which is

proportional to the NB's post-advertising market size or irrelevant if as = O.
In the remainder of this section we first consider two special cases of the general setup,
first, in Section 3.2, pricing decisions are fixed and only advertising decisions are made and
second, in Section 3.3, advertising decisions are fixed and only pricing decisions are made. We
characterize equilibrium decisions in both cases and provide some managerial intuition for
6

these results. We conclude this section by presenting the general case in Section 3.4. In the
following derivations we omit some steps which we include for completeness in Appendix B.

3.2

Advertising Only Case

In this section we first consider the special case where the NB and SB prices are pre
determined before making advertising decisions.

As we model the advertising decisions

of the national and store brands under a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, using back
ward induction, it is straightforward to show the SB's best response function, AS(AN), for
a given AN value is as written in (3). Since (2) is concave in As, its first order condition
(FOC) leads to the store brand's reaction function AS(AN):
As (AN) =

{

PS+{3aNPN _ a (A + A ) if Ps+{3aNPN
2cs
S
N ---.!:i
2as.cs

o

> A +A

N---.!:i

otherwise.

(3)

From (3), we note that As is decreasing in as because the SB benefits from free-riding off of
the advertising spillover from the NB, while As is increasing in aN due to the share of the
increasing revenue from selling NB products. Substituting AS(AN) into (1) gives a concave
function, so the FOC determine the NB's optimal and equilibrium advertising decisions.
(1-{3)(I-aN as) . PN - AN if PN
2

A::" =

and

As=

CN-

1-{3 . PJ:L 2
CN

AN

_

o
o
+ {3aN PN

2 Cs

2

_ a (l-{3)(l-aN as) PN
S

cs

2

eN

o
2 Cs

(4)

otherwise

Ips

1 E!i.

> fiN and ElL > rP
PN
if PN > fiN and ElL
< A,
PN - '-P
if PN :s. fiN and ElL
PN > rP

+ {3aN
PJ:L 2 Cs

o

Ps > rP
if PN > fiN and PN
< A,
if PN > fiN and ElL
PN - If'

if PN :s. fiN and ElL
PN > rP
otherwise

a A
S---.!:!....

(5)

where fiN = (1_{3)(2t.~"N"s)AN and rP = (1- ;J)as(l - aNas)~ - /JaN' The above four cases
correspond to one interior optimal solution (AN> 0 and As > 0), two corner solutions
(AN> 0 and As

= 0);

(AN

= 0 and

As

> 0), and one degenerate solution (AN = As = 0).

From the conditions for each case, it can be concluded that: first, for the NB to launch any
advertising campaign, the price of the NB product must exceed some threshold, fiN, which is
increasing (in weak sense, i.e., non-decreasing) in all parameters eN, AN, ;J, aN, and as when
the SB's advertising is complementary, i.e., the spillover effect with aN > O. Therefore, the
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NB will not advertise if any combination of the following scenarios holds: high advertising
cost, large base market, high fraction of profit going to the retailer, or high spillover rates.
For the spillover rates, while the free-riding effect of ow is intuitive, it does not seem obvious
that high NB-to-SB spillover rate as also discourages the NB from advertisement. This
is the case because high as reduces the SB's advertising effort, which means less spillover
from the SB advertisement toward the NB product. On the other hand, when the SB's
advertising is competitive, aN < 0, the price threshold fiN is lower, implying the NB would
start advertising and invest more in advertisement as competition becomes more intense.
Second and independently, for the retailer to invest in advertising the SB product, the
price ratio PS/PN must be high enough, greater than the threshold ¢, which is increasing in
CS/CN and as (assuming aNaS ~ 0.5) while decreasing in (3 and aN with complementary SB

advertising. If advertising is one of the key indicators of a premium SB, then a premium SB
should possess any combination of the following characteristics: low costs of advertising ratio
CS/CN (ease of advertising in comparison with the NB), low NB advertising spillover (unique

NB features), high fraction of the NB sales revenue to the retailer (mature NB product so
the retailer has more bargaining power over the NB), and high SB advertising spillover (high
substitutability of SB to NB). When the SB advertising becomes competitive, AN increases
to stay competitive, while

As decreases to free-ride from the gain of a higher AN as otherwise

a SB would reduce its revenue from selling fewer NB goods.
The non-trivial solutions of As, (5), provide a different aspect in explaining the SB's
advertising strategy: the first term PsiCs corresponds to the effort for its own SB product
while the second term (3aNPN / Cs corresponds to the effect of NB sales due to the share
(3 of all NB revenue and advertising spillover aN. When both SB and NB advertise, the
advertising effort is adjusted down by spilled efforts from the NB's advertisement as(l 
(3)(1 - aNas)PN/CN, and when only the SB advertises the benefit is adjusted by the base
market size.

3.3

Pricing Only Case

In this section we consider the case in which for given advertising expenditures of the NB
and SB, each may only maximize their expected profit by setting their pricing strategies, PN
and Ps respectively. Carrying out backward induction we can show that (2) is concave in
Ps for a given PN and fixed advertising strategies. Determining the optimal SB price for a

given PN leads to:
*( )
Ps PN

=

As

+ as(AN + AN) + (bs + (3bN )PN
2

as

8

.

(6)

It can be readily seen from (6) that first, the SB's best response pricing decision PS(PN) is
increasing in the market size (or equivalently, marketing efforts made by itself and spilled
from the NB). Second, P'S(PN) is linearly increasing in PN because of competing effects bs
and f3b N, We can then substitute PS(PN) in (1) and find the equilibrium NB price, P'N, via
FOCs:

(7)
The form of P'N in (7) shows that it is increasing in both advertising efforts: the first part
of the numerator (AN

+ AN + O<NAs)

is the direct effect from self, NB, advertising and SB

spillover efforts, while the second part /J:s [As + o<s(AN + AN)] reflects the indirect effect
from the SB pricing strategy influenced by the SB advertising and NB advertising spillover.
In the denominator, the sensitivity of NB demand to NB price is dampened from aN to

aN - /J:s(b s + f3b N) due to the competing price of the SB, Ps, in (5) that is also increasing
PN. We may find P'S by substituting (7) into (6), which we omit in this exposition. Note
that to ensure the concavity of the NB's profit function, (7) is only valid in the case that:

(8)
Inequality (8) requires the direct demand sensitivity aN to be not totally offset by the indirect
competing effect g::s (b s + f3b N). Should the downward slope aN be overly compensated
and become upward sloping (inequality (8) is violated meaning the profit function becomes
convexly increasing), it is then to the NB's advantage to set P'N as high as possible to gain
infinite profit, which is not a well-defined scenario. Due to this seemingly degenerate scenario,
we do not consider it in detail in this paper.
As pricing is a focal point of this subsection, we glean further insights by investigating
the relative magnitude of the two prices, P'N and P'S. To have P'N > P'S as most commonly
seen, the following relationship must hold:

(9)
The left hand side of (9) is the advertising effort ratio measuring the NB's effort with respect
to the SB's with the adjustment (bN/2aS) due to price competition. The right hand side
measures the NB's demand sensitivity in price with respect to the SB's. The conditions in
which this inequality is violated so that P'N

~
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P'S characterize a premium SB. From (9) we

determine that a premium store brand will exists, for a set of fixed advertising decisions in
the complementary advertising setting, if: the spillover rate is high from NB to SB (as) and
a powerful retailer (fJ), maybe due to a mature NB product, and the spillover rate is low
from SB to NB (aN), perhaps due to some unique properties of the SB product.
As we allow for competitive advertising, i.e., aN < 0, we observe that in this case
there is a theoretical possibility for
AN

+ AN <

PN

to be negative or zero. However, for this to occur,

laNIAs, which means the SB must put forth so much advertising effort that it

advertises more than the NB and the base market size and effectively advertises the NB out
of existence. Though theoretically feasible, we know of no such SB that has so much market
power that it can ever impact the NB price to such a great extent.

3.4

General Case

This section considers the general case in which each brand determines its optimal advertising
and pricing decisions in tandem. We assume that the NB sets its pricing and advertising
decisions before the SB. Through backward induction, we find the best response functions of
the SB, i.e., As(AN, PN) and pS(AN' PN). We will then substitute the best response functions
of the SB into the NB's profit function to determine the NB's optimal adverting and pricing
levels, i.e., AN and PN'
We first start with the SB's best response functions by considering its FOCs with respect
to As and Ps to find As(AN,PN) and pS(AN,PN):
A* (A
)_
S N,PN -

bs+f3bN+2f3asaNp _
4ascs-l
N

{

0

a (A
S

N

+ --..!':{
A )

if

bs+f3bN+2f3asaNp
<>s(4ascs-l)
N

> A N--..!':{
+A

otherwise.
(10)

* (A

Ps

N,PN ) --

f3aN+2bscs+2f3bNcsp
4ascs-l
N
{

o

if

bs+f3bN+2f3asaNp
a:s(4ascs-l)
N

.
otherwIse.

> A +A

N--..!:!...

.

(11)

To ensure optimality of (10) and (11) the second order optimality conditions (SOCs) must
be satisfied, i.e., the Hessian of (2) must be negative semidefinite, equivalently 4ascs > 1
must hold.
Substituting the SB's best response functions (10) and (11) into (1), and we find the
Hessian of the NB's profit function as

(12)

]
10

.

To ensure that (12) is negative semidefinite, and that the PN and AN we find using FOCs
are maximums, the following condition must hold as a lower bound on eN:

(1 - owas)2(1- (3)

(13)

To have a valid bound, the denominator of the RHS (right hand side) must be positive, i.e.,
a N > a N (bs+bNi3+2asC<Ni3)
+ bN C<Ni3+2bscs+2bNi3cS.
This requires the direct demand sensitivity
4ascs-l
4ascs-1
to be not totally offset by the indirect competing advertising effect aN (bs+b;!s~:a~C<Ni3) and
competing pricing effect bNC<Ni3+!~~~~~~bNi3cS. Analogous to inequality (8) in the pricing-only
case, except for the additional competing advertising effect, should the downward slope

aN

be overly compensated and become upward sloping, NB then sets PN as high as possible to
gain infinite profit, which is not a well-defined scenario. We now find PN and AN of the NB
using the FOCs 0!:.l:!..
= 0 and a"N
= 02 :
aAN
apN

07rN = 0
oAN

=* PN(A N) = (1- (3)~;~ aNas) (AN

+ AN)

(3, as, OW E (0,1),

07rN = 0
OPN
=* .6.(AN + AN) = 0 after substituting the value of PN(A N).

(14)

(15)

The functional form of PN(A N), (14), shows a linear relationship between PN and AN. The
optimal form of AN' shown in (15), has AN

-AN as .6. is a constant with respect to PN
and AN' This means that no interior solution exists to 7rN(A N,PNIAS(AN,PN),Ps(AN,PN))
as we require the advertising effort exerted, AN, and the base market size, AN, to be
=

non-negative. Therefore, as AN E [0,00), AN = 0 or AN is unbounded.

However, as

7rN(A N,PNIAS(AN,PN ),pS(AN,PN)) is concave, guaranteed by (13) and we identified at least
one interior stationary point, then for all values of AN > -AN, 7rN(A N,PNIAS(AN,PN ),pS(AN,PN))
is decreasing. This means that the optimal feasible advertising effort for the NB is AN = O.
The fact that AN = 0 may be comforting as the only other option is to have AN -+ 00,
which would indicate the NB could turn its first mover advantage into a "money pump."
The result in this section may seem counter intuitive as NBs still advertise in the presence
of SBs. However, as the special cases in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 indicate, if either the the
2Please see Appendix B for cletails

11

pricing or advertising decisions are fixed, then the other decision may not necessarily be
trivial (zero). This may indeed be the case as in some organizations pricing and advertising
decisions may be made sequentially as is indicated by Eastlack and Rao (1986) in the case
of V-8. Alternatively, there may be externalities that force firms, national brands included,
to advertise as discussed by McDonald and Wren (2012), we do not model such externalities
in this paper.
We conclude this section by discussion the implications of our results. From (10) and (11)
2b scs+2/3bN c s < 1. However as noted
we note that A *s ..t.
r 0 and p*S < p*N if and only if {JaN+ 4aSC$
1
)
previously a premium store brand may actually set P'S such that P'S 2: piv, which implies
2b
/3aN+ scs+2/3bNCS > 1. This occurs if (3 is large i.e. SB receives a larger fraction of NB
4ascs 1
)
,
sales, in the case of strong SB market power. Similarly when ow is large, i.e., there is large
spillover from NB advertising to SB demand, this may occur in the case of strong substitutes
between SB and NB goods. To summarize, though the NB does not advertise and the SB
may set

P'S 2: piv in the general case of our model,

we discussed that corporations may still

advertise and price if these decisions are made in sequence or separately from one another.

4

Insight and Conclusion

This work adds to the literature on advertising and pricing interplay that exists between a
national brand and a store brand good. With the strong rise in store brand market share and
the propensity of stores to launch premium store brands, we believe the managerial insights
for both a retailer, store brand, and a manufacturer, national brand, will be of great interest.
Table 1 summarizes the main contributions of this article using a stylized model. When only
advertising decisions are considered, we found that premium store brands strive for a low
NB spillover rate and a high SB spillover rate (or low competitive effect from SB adver
tising); while when only considering pricing decisions, however, we found that the opposite
conditions are preferred, i.e., high NB and low SB spillover (high with SB competition) rates
encourage premium store brands. It is important to note that whether the SB advertising is
competitive or complementary has a deciding effect on how the retailer's bargaining power
over the wholesale price would influence the advertising and pricing strategies. Hence the
characterization of a premium store brand depends on which marketing/promotion instru
ment (advertising or pricing) is the primary method for driving the demand. In the case when
both methods are simultaneously utilized, the national brand manufacturer always exerts
no advertising effort and free-rides the retailer. However, it may not be the case that both
pricing and advertising decisions are made simultaneously, but rather a repeated/sequential
process is used to determine the final equilibrium decisions.
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I Section I Decisions

Results
NB advertises iff PN > PN while SB advertises iff lli
> </>.
PN
Premium S B will exert advertising effort As if it has:
• low advertising cost ratio

.ffl.
CN

• low NB spillover as
§3.2

Advertising

• for aN > 0, high SB complementary advertising aN
• for aN < 0, low SB competing advertising aN
• high retail margin
f3 otherwise

f3 when

.ffl.
eN

>

as

(I-aN);
-aNO:S

or low

• high NB spillover as
§3.3

Pricing

• for aN > 0, low SB complementary advertising aN
• for aN < 0, high SB competing advertising aN
• high retail margin

f3

°

NB never advertises so AN = < As and PN > Ps iff
/laN+2bscs+2/3bN CS < 1. Premium SB will price P*s > P*N if
4ascs 1
it has:
§3.4

Advertising
& Pricing

• for aN > 0, high SB complementary advertising aN
• for aN < 0, low SB competing advertising aN
• high retail margin
otherwise

f3 when

-aN

<

2bNCs; or low

f3

Table 1: A summary of the main results.
In the future, using retail data, it will be interesting to develop empirical methods to
identify favorable market conditions for a premium store brand. In addition to this empirical
question, some analytical questions remain unanswered. In particular, this article assumes
that the advertising cost function is quadratic. This is a fine analytical assumption with
diminishing return on investment, but in practice there might exist some other function
governing the cost-demand relationship, such as an "S-shaped" function. Using historical
13

retail data, we would like to derive particular functional forms for the cost-demand function
and derive the optimal decisions and compare them to what occurs in practice. Finally, we
would also like to extend our model to take into account the case in which a national and a
store brand make decisions simultaneously, i.e., there is no leader-follower dominance.
As one can see, there are quite a few open areas of research in this field. However, we
think that this work is a necessary step to help retailers make more informed store brand
decisions and national brand manufacturers be better prepared to respond to the introduction
of additional store brands.
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A

List of Mathematical Symbols and Notation

SB: Store Brand
NB: National Brand
Ps: the retail price of the SB good
PN:

the retail price of the NB good
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As: the market size of the SB, also referred to as the advertising effort exerted by the SB
AN: the market size of the NB, also referred to as the advertising effort exerted by the NB
AN: the base market size for the NB good

/3:

the fraction of the NB sales that are retained by the SB, retailer, we assume

/3 E (0,1)

as: the advertising spillover from the NB to the SB, we assume as E (0,1)
aN: the advertising spillover from the SB to the NB, we assume aN E (-1,1); aN

< 0

models a competitive advertising environment and aN > 0 models a complementary
advertising environment
as: the negative effect of Ps on demand for the SB good
aN: the negative effect of PN on demand for the NB good
bs : the positive effect of PN on demand for the SB good

bN : the positive effect of Ps on demand for the NB good
Cs: the cost of advertising effort exerted by the SB
CN:

the cost of advertising effort exerted by the NB

7rs(As, psIAN, PN): the profit function of the SB
7rN(A N ,PN): the profit function of the NB

B

Mathematical Appendix

In this appendix we provide the details of the results presented in Section 3.

B.l

Advertising Only Case

+ as (AN + AN) - asps + bSPN)
+/3PN(A N + AN + aNAs - aNPN + bNps)
-cs [(As + as (AN + AN ))2 - (as(AN + AN ))2]

(16)

ps(As

17

.

Its Foe leads to the profit maximizer As:
d7rs(AsIAN)
= Ps
dAs

+ (30tNPN -

2cs(As + as (AN

~ A*s -- Ps +2(3aNPN - as (A N
---,'"
Cs

+ AN)) =

0

+ AN )

(17)



In (17) As is an interior point solution, including non-negativity constraint on As we have:
As (AN)

=

{

PS+{3C<NPN _ a (A + A ) if PS+{3C<NPN > A + A
2cs
S
N ---.l:{
2c<~cs
N ---.l:{.

o

(18)

otherwise.

Note that we know the interior point is a maximum as 7rs(AsIAN) is concave, d2"S~~1IAN)
-2cs

s

:s: O.

=

Using (18), we may rewrite 7rN(AN) as:
7rN(AN)

= (1 - (3)PN (AN + AN + aN (pS+g:;PN - as (AN + AN)) - aNPN + bNPs)
- CN [(AN

+ AN)2 -

AN 2].

We now find the FOe for 7rN(AN):

First note that 7rN(A N) is concave, d2";:.~AN)
cry

=

N

-2CN

:s:

O. For AN to be non-negative, it

implies PN >
(I (3)tl
)AN. Substituting the interior point value of A*N· into PSt{3C<NPN
>
-ctNets OsCs

AN + AN, the condition of interior As in (18), we have:
Ps + (3aNPN > (1 - (3)PN(1 - aNas)
2CN
2ascs
Ps
Cs
==} -?: (1 - (3)as(1- aNas)- - (3aN.
PN
CN

Using the notation defined in Section 3.2, we let PN = (1_!3)(2t~C<NC<S)AN and ¢> = (1- (3)as(l
aNaS)~
- (3aN. For each advertising decision, As' and AN, we have four possible scenarios:
CN
both solutions are interior, only one of them is interior, or none of them are interior. They
are defined with respect to the relationship between PN and PN, and independently between
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Hand ¢.

PN

(1-!3)(l-aN a s) . PN - AN
H ->,1.,
if PN PN and PN
'Y
2
cN

1-13 l!.!i.
-2- . CN

A~=

A
-.l:!..

-

?
?

and PN
H <¢
H ->,1.,
ifPN <PN and PN
t.p
otherwise
if PN

o
o

PN

(19)

= 0 meaning the profit of the NB is
2
CN [(AN + AN)2 - AN ] . Using FOe we

Note that the second case of (28) follows from As
7fN(AN )

= (1 -

(3)PN(AN

+ AN + aNPN + bNPs)

-

have:

Note that in this case d2"d~~AN) = -1 < 0 meaning that 7fN(A N ) is concave.
N

Similarly for

As we have:
l~
2 cs

+ !3aN l!.!i. _
2

As = ol~ +
2 Cs

a
S

cs

a S-.!!....
A

!3aN l!.!i. 2

(1-!3)(I-aN a S) l!.!i.
2
eN

rs

o

H ->,1.,
if PN ? PN and PN
'Y
H <¢
if PN ? PN and PN
if PN < PN andH>,I.,
PN - 'Y

(20)

otherwise

Note that the third case of (29) follows from AN

= 0 meaning the profit of the SB is 7fs(As)

ps(As+asAN-asps+bsPN )+{3PN(A N +a N A s -aNPN+b NPs)-cs [(As

+ asAN J2 -

=

(asAN )2]

Using FOe we have:
d7fs(As)
dAs

= Ps + (3aNPN

- 2cs(As

+ asAN) = 0

~ A*s -- PS+{3aNPN
A
2
- as N·

---,-

Cs



Just as with the other cases, d271,fs) = -2cs ::; 0 meaning that 7fs(As) is concave.
s

B.2

Pricing Only Case

+ as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN)
+(3PN(A N + AN + aNAS - aNPN + bNPs)
-cs [(As + as(AN + AN))2 - (as(AN + AN))2].

ps(As
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(21)

We now explore the FOe of the SB profit function assuming advertising decisions are fixed.
As

+ as(AN + AN)

- asps + bSPN - asps

As

+ as(AN + AN) + bSPN + (JPNb N

+ (JPNb N = 0

2as

(22)

First note that d2"sdPfiPN) = -2as which means 7rS(PSIPN) is concave in PS. Note that all of
Ps

the terms in the right hand side of (22) are positive, so the interior solution PS(PN) is always
feasible.
We now write 7rN(PN) , given PS(PN):

(1 -

(J)PN ( AN

-CN [(AN

(1 -

AN

+ AN)2 -

(J) ( AN

+(1 -

+ AN + aNAs -

As + as(AN + AN) + bSPN
2as

+ (JPNbN))

AN 2 ].

+ AN + aNAs -

(J)PN (-aN

aNPN + bN (

+

+ AN + aNAs +

aNPN

+

;:s (bs + (JbN))

;:s (As

+ as(AN + AN) + bSPN + (JPNbN))

=0

#:s (As + as(AN + AN))

2 [aN - g'::(bs+(Jb N)]

Note that

2

d

have aN 2:

"J;;t

N

)

= 2(1 - (J)

g,:: (bs + (JbN).

U,:: (bs + (JbN) - aN)' in order to ensure concavity we must

The numerator of PH is always positive, only the denominator

may be negative in the case aN < ~(bs + (Jb N), in order to ensure PH is non-negative we
have add the condition that aN > _as (b s + (Jb N ) and to avoid division by zero, which is

;N

stronger than the concavity condition. As discussed in Section 3.3, we do not consider the
case of PH :::: 0 even when aN is negative, as this would imply a SB may advertise a NB out
of existence.

B.3

General Case

+ as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN)
+(JPN(A N + AN + aNAs - aNPN + bNPs)

ps(As

-Cs [(As +as(AN +AN))2 - (as(AN +A N )?].
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(23)

[

_

[

B"s(As,psIAN,PN) ]
BAs
B"s(As,psIAN,PN)
Bps

(24)

+ (3PND!N - 2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN))
]
(As + D!S(AN + AN) - 2asPs + bSPN) + (3P NbN

(25)

Ps

(26)

[

-2cs
1 ]
1
-2as

(27)

For the SB's best response to the NB's actions AN andpN, we solve for FOes, 'i77Ts(As,PsIAN,PN)
[

=

~ ], to find AS(AN,PN) and PS(AN,PN):
Ps + (3PND!N - 2cs(As + D!S(AN
(As

Ps As -

+ D!S(AN + AN) -

+ AN))
2asPs + bSPN) + (3P NbN

-

0

-

0

+ D!S(AN + AN)) - (3PND!N
-(3P NbN - D!S(AN + AN) + 2as . (2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) -

2cs(As

As(l - 4ascs) -

_

(3PND!N) - (3PND!N - bSPN

+ AN) + 4ascs(D!s(AN + AN)) - 2aS(3PND!N - (3PND!N (-b s - (3b N - 2(3aSD!N)PN + D!s(4ascs -l)(AN + AN)
bs+!3bN+2!3aS<>Np _ D! (A + A ) if bs +!3 bN+2!3 aS<>N
> A +A
4ascs-1
N
S
N
-.l'!..
<>s(4ascs 1) p N
N-.l'!..
-(3PNbN - D!S(AN

{

o

otherwise.
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bSPN

4ascs -1
/3"N+2bscs+2/3bNCS P

if

o

otherwise.

4ascs-l

{

N

bs+/3bN+2/3as"N P
frs(4ascs-l)

N

> A +A

N---1i

Given the optimal values ofpS(AN,PN) and AS(AN,PN) we rewrite 1rN(A N,PN) as:

In order to ensure the FOes, 'V1rN(A N,PN) 22

[~],

minimize 1rN(AN,PN), we have

means that:

Given this condition, we consider '\l7rN(A N,PN) = [

~ ]:

PN

o

A (1 - (3)(1 ) + 4 2as{3cx'!v+2{3cxNbN+bsCXN+2{3csb'!v+2bscsbN-aN(4ascs-l) Note
iY-NiY-S
eN
(4ases 1 )
(1)
. "
w1lere '-" -owCXs
that in an interior solution, AN = -AN, however as AN ;:0: 0 and AN ;:0: 0 an interior solution
is not feasible and only a corner solution exists. A corner solution is the only option for
AN E [0, (0). As an interior stationary point exists and by construction 7rN(A N,PN) is

concave, we know that 7rN(A N,PN) is increasing for all values of AN < -AN and decreasing
for all values AN ;:0: -AN, and thus AN
maximizes 7rN(A N,PNIAs,ps).

= O'PN = (1_{3~~~A:NCXS) is the feasible point that

23

Sensitivity Analysis on (3

C

The optimal decisions, pricing and advertising, determined in Section 3 may depend on the
wholesale price that we model using an exogenously set parameter (3. In this section we
examine how these decisions change with (3.
From Section 3.2 we know that when Ps and PN are fixed, the optimal advertising deci
sions are:
(l-{3)(l-aN a s) • l!.!:L _ A
and lli. > ¢>
2
eN---.l:!.... if PN > PN
PN
1-{3 . l!.!:L - AN
"
if PN > PN and lli.
2
eN
_
PN <
- If'
(28)
Al\r =
> ¢>
o
if PN S PN and lli.
PN

o

and
IE,;:
2 Cs

A*s=

otherwise

+ {3aN
PN
2 Cs

_

a

S

(l-{3)(l-aN a s)

2

l!.!:L
eN

o
1 E,;:
2 Cs

+ {3aN
l!.!:L 2 Cs

o

if PN > PN and
if PN > PN and
ifPN SPN and

asA
-1:i

lli.
PN

lli.
PN
lli.
PN

> ¢>
<
"
- If'
> ¢>

(29)

otherwise

We take the derivative of each decision with respect to (3 to determine how each will change
with the wholesale price:
(l-aN a s) .

2

8A N

_1 . l!.!:L
2

8(3

eN

0
0

and
9'.I:!..PN

2 Cs

l!.!:L
eN

> PN and
> PN and

lli.

if PN S PN and
otherwise

lli.

ifPN

if PN

+ a S (l-aN2 a s) PN
eN

o
aN

ifPN

if PN
T!..K

2 es

lli.
PN
PN

> PN and
> PN and
S PN and

if PN
otherwise

o

PN

> ¢>
< ¢>

(30)
> ¢>

Ps
PN

lli.
PN
lli.
PN

> ¢>
<
"
- 'f'
> ¢>

(31)

From the equation (30) and (31) we note that the NB will decrease their advertising ef
fort with (3, Le., lower wholesale price will lead to lower advertising effort. Conversely, as
wholesale price decreases, (3 increases, the SB will exert larger effort in the case advertising
campaigns are complementary, aN is positive. However, in the case advertising campaigns
are competitive, the effect of (3 on the SB advertising decision may depend on the relative
magnitude between aN and as among other parameters, Le., whether the direct competing
is stronger than indirect spillover effect as (l-a.;"a s ) PN
effect a2N l!.!:L
•
Cs
eN
~

In the pricing only case we have:
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and

Looking at the partial derivatives we have:
oP'N

AN + AN + aNAS + /j!fs [As

+ asIAN + AN) 1

2 [aN - /j!fs(b s + fJb N

ofJ -

and

(* +

ops _ bN
ofJ - 2as

PN

f

(32)

RPartiaIP'N)
ofJ
.

(33)

f.'

From equation (32) we note that PN is always increasing in fJ. The same relationship holds
for Ps as PN(fJ) :2: 0 by condition (8), and thus Ps is also increasing in fJ.
We finally consider the general case:
P'N
A*N

and

--1

-

(l-fl)(I-aNas)

-

0

obS+~~~:~~saN P'N o

aSAN if bs~:t:';~:~l)N P'N > AN
otherwise.
flC<N+2bscs+2flbNCSp* if bs+fl bN+2fl a sC<N p* > A
4ascs-l

N

a:s(4ascs 1)

--..!:l..

N

otherwise.
TaJdng the partial derivatives of the equilibrium decisions with respect to fJ we have:

(34)
and
if bs+fl bN+2flasC<N p*
a:s(4ascs-l)

N

>A

---.!:!....

otherwise.
if bs+flbN+2{3asaNp* > A
Qs(4ascs-l)

otherwise.

25

N

---.li..

(35)

From (34) we note that PN is decreasing in {3 for the general hand. Things are not so obvious
for the SB, As and Ps may increase or decrease with {3 depending on the relationships between
the terms. If the first term of each of the partials is greater than the second then, the optimal
decisions decrease with {3, otherwise they both increase with {3.
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